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 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
 
  A jury convicted Christopher Welshans of possessing and distributing child 
pornography. Welshans initially appealed his judgment of conviction, and we remanded 
for resentencing. United States v. Welshans, 892 F.3d 566, 583 (3d Cir. 2018). The 
District Court then held a resentencing hearing. The parties agreed that Welshans’s 
sentencing range was 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. But the District Court awarded 
Welshans a five-offense-level downward variance because two enhancements 
recommended by the Presentence Investigation Report did not “make [his] conduct [any] 
more serious or offensive.” Appx 31; see also id. at 32. With that variance, the sentencing 
range for Welshans became 121 to 151 months’ imprisonment.  
The District Court then considered Welshans’s argument that his recent diagnosis 
of autism warranted an additional downward variance. But the District Court declined to 
give Welshans that additional downward variance and sentenced Welshans to 121 
months’ imprisonment—the bottom of the reduced sentencing range. Welshans timely 
appealed. Because the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced 
Welshans, we will affirm.1 
 On appeal, Welshans asserts that the District Court abused its discretion by not 
granting the downward variance based on his recent autism diagnosis. In doing so, he 
essentially challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We review the 
substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. 
 
1 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have 





Woronowicz, 744 F.3d 848, 851 (3d Cir. 2014). “An abuse of discretion occurs only 
[when] the district court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable—in 
short, [when] no reasonable person would adopt the district court’s view.” United States 
v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). “[W]e continue to recognize that reasonableness is a range, not a point. As long 
as a sentence falls within the broad range of possible sentences that can be considered 
reasonable in light of the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, we must affirm.” United States v. 
Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Accordingly, we will affirm a sentence as substantively reasonable “unless no reasonable 
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 
the reasons the [sentencing] court provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 
(3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  
 The District Court gave due consideration to Welshans’s autism diagnosis when it 
sentenced him. It “believe[d] that [his] diagnosis of Level 1 autism spectrum disorder 
[was] relevant.” Appx 32 (emphasis added). The District Court then discussed at length 
Welshans’s ability to function in society and all his various accomplishments despite his 
diagnosis. It also acknowledged that incarceration can be difficult for people who suffer 
from autism. Yet the District Court believed that “correctional treatment in the federal 
correctional system . . . [would] benefit” Welshans. Id. at 34.  
 After carefully considering Welshans’s autism diagnosis, the District Court 
declined to grant Welshans’s requested downward variance. It refused to grant the 





concerned about protecting the public, because [it] want[ed Welshans] to have an 
effective correctional treatment, and because of the nature and circumstances of this 
offense, which . . . [it] consider[ed] to be very serious.” Id. at 36. Instead, the District 
Court imposed a sentence at the bottom of the sentencing range that already included a 
substantial downward variance. 
 Given the District Court’s thorough consideration of Welshans’s arguments 
supporting his requested downward variance based on his autism diagnosis, we cannot 
conclude that “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on 
[Welshans] for the reasons the [D]istrict [C]ourt provided.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. Still, 
Welshans argues that the District Court abused its discretion by “slighting” or “mis-
weighing” the evidence about his autism diagnosis. See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at 38. Yet 
nothing about the District Court’s consideration of the evidence submitted by Welshans 
was “arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable.” See Green, 617 F.3d at 239 (citation 
omitted). If anything, the District Court “thoroughly and thoughtfully” considered 
Welshans’s arguments relating to his autism diagnosis before ultimately rejecting his 
requested downward variance. See United States v. Dolehide, 663 F.3d 343, 349 (8th Cir. 
2011). In sum, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by declining to grant 
Welshans’s requested downward variance based on his autism diagnosis. 
* * * 
 Because Welshans’s sentence “falls within the broad range of possible sentences 
that can be considered reasonable,” see Wise, 515 F.3d at 218, we will affirm. 
